The Alternative Housing Program for Affordable Living

Alternative Housing Program

By Tomaž Štih

Introduction

The affordable alternative housing program would pursue a single (constitutional!) goal: the accessibility of suitable housing. Its success would be measured by how many years an average household needs to become the owner of their own (appropriately sized!) home near or in the place where they work.

For example, if the real credit capacity of a single-person household with an average income is eighty thousand euros, then the program is considered very successful if the price of an average small apartment near a larger urban center is eighty thousand euros – a bit more in Ljubljana, a bit less in Murska Sobota.

The proposed measures would focus mainly on increasing, expanding, and deepening private supply, on debureaucratization, and on all other factors that influence housing prices (centralization of the state, mobility obstacles, etc.).

The way to achieve this goal would be to very quickly encourage the market to create a multitude of new dwellings, varied enough that each first-time seeker can choose one suited to their budget and lifestyle.

Since the prevailing cultural model in Slovenia is the single-family house, and young people wish to live in cities, we must address both trends and simplify and lower the cost of both – simple construction and investment construction upwards.

I. Tax simplification

Today we have a multitude of taxes on real estate, and due to this chaos, multiple taxation occurs in some cases. The tax system is further complicated by government announcements of new taxes every few months.

This not only hinders market functioning but also represents an unnecessary burden on the state administration.

A tax simplification is proposed – the establishment of a single stable and long-term tax that everyone understands, with a general tax allowance like in personal income tax – to protect the socially vulnerable. And no other exceptions.

The tax must not significantly increase current taxation and must incorporate all other sectoral taxes and fees (e.g., property tax, building land use fee, cadastral income, utility contribution, tax on rental income, real estate transfer tax, etc.).

It must be an original revenue of the local community, with no exceptions, assessed from the generalized market value of land. The municipality may independently set the rate between zero and a legally defined maximum. This enshrines tax competition.

To prevent abuse, if a municipality sets the tax rate below ¾ of the national average, it is not entitled to funds from the equalization mechanism.

II. Incentives for the rental market

We want to reform legislation so that housing is accessible and rental is no longer mainly an emergency solution for those who have no hope of ever owning – but instead a mechanism that enriches lifestyles and encourages mobility.

People should freely choose their form of living, and the state’s role must be to offer as much choice as possible. To make renting attractive, the state must strengthen both the position of the tenant and the landlord.

• Abolition of tax on rental income
  Currently, income from property rental is taxed at 25%, which discourages landlords. If the owner already pays the unified property tax, then the rental tax is double taxation. Tax relief would encourage more rental supply.
• Eviction guarantee for non-paying tenants
  Lengthy court procedures discourage property owners. Introducing a guaranteed eviction deadline for non-payers, and possibly covering costs if the state misses the deadline, would improve legal security for landlords.
• Legal regulation of deposits
  Current law does not define clear rules for security deposits. Legal provisions would protect both tenants and landlords and reduce disputes.
• Standardized lease agreements
  A simple template contract would reduce legal uncertainty and simplify procedures, enabling quick and digital lease agreements.
• Automatic registration of residence for tenants
  Upon signing a lease, the tenant’s residence would be registered automatically, unless they opt out. This would simplify bureaucracy.
• Utilities in the tenant's name
  Contracts for basic services (electricity, water, gas, internet) could be signed directly by the tenant, ensuring clear responsibility for payments and protecting the owner.
• Voluntary tenant credit scoring
  Optional ratings would help landlords decide and allow tenants to prove payment reliability without a mandatory central registry.

III. Legal simplifications

To re-enable widespread private construction, as known in the past, we need a comprehensive simplification of spatial and building legislation.

This task must not be left only to professional associations, local governments, or licensed planners, as they often have a vested interest in maintaining a complex, exclusive system they know how to navigate – and profit from.

Instead, the state must establish a special deregulation group made up mostly of consumers – those who do not yet have a home and are directly affected. These are future builders, not those already housed and benefiting from high prices.

The group’s mission: to write a separate, short, and understandable legal framework for single-family houses and small residential buildings, separate from existing spatial legislation, with the highest possible degree of simplicity and legal certainty.

The group could consider the following simplifications (unordered):

• Express permits for simple and small buildings (tiny houses).
• Expand the list of structures not requiring building permits (e.g., up to 100 m²).
• Remove construction logbooks and mandatory signage for private builds.
• Remove the need for occupancy permits for owner-built homes.
• Eliminate approvals for trivial changes that don’t impact neighbors or the environment.
• Allow pre-approved plans (model projects) without lengthy review.
• Automatic rezoning based on objective criteria (e.g., proximity to infrastructure).
• Simple liability statement and basic technical report instead of elaborate documentation.

• Modular municipal spatial plans (OPNs): allow zoning of micro-locations without changing the entire plan.
• Right to request land-use change (e.g., farmland within settlements).
• Detailed spatial plans (OPPNs) should be the exception, not the rule.
• Remove arbitrary housing quotas in OPNs.
• Specialized state body empowered to expand settlements if municipalities obstruct growth.

• Allow construction without full utility readiness if alternatives are provided (e.g., septic tanks, solar, rainwater capture).
• Voluntary non-connection fee – if someone chooses self-sufficiency.
• Direct utility contracts without municipal or monopoly interference.

• Recognize mobile and temporary living (van life, container homes) with clear legal status.
• Allow alternative homes on private land without state interference (with liability declaration).

The core of this legal simplification is not just reducing bureaucracy, but restoring dignified and affordable living conditions for those excluded today.

Slovenia achieved a housing miracle when people were allowed to build their own homes. Today, it has become nearly impossible. It is time to reopen that path.

IV. Lowering land prices

To reduce land prices for construction, competition is a much better tool than taxation. If buildable land becomes cheaper due to abundant supply, this has the same effect on investors as a tax — but does not harm those using the land for housing.

In Slovenia, land is not expensive because there is little of it. In reality, more than 95% of the country is undeveloped. Our territory covers 20,273 km² and is home to just under 900,000 households. Of these, about 25% do not own their homes. If each of them needed 350 m² of land, that’s only 0.4% of the national territory.

Anecdotally, even if we allocated forest land for this purpose, forest coverage would drop from 58% to 57.5%.

Buildable land is expensive not because of scarcity, but because of a lack of permits. This is called artificial scarcity. It’s like a group of tourists in the middle of a lake allowed to drink through just one straw. Their problem is not water shortage…

A simple formula to lower the price of buildable land: allow construction on more of it.

Helicopter land

The state owns almost a quarter of Slovenia’s land. We propose that 2% of state-owned land near towns with good infrastructure be reclassified as standard-size (e.g., 350 m²) buildable plots and allocated as so-called helicopter land for single-family housing.

Helicopter land means this land is privatized for a symbolic fee or free of charge. To ensure sustainability, the land is not inheritable and returns to the state upon the owner’s death, replenishing the pool of available helicopter plots.

In these zones, more relaxed construction rules may apply, such as pre-approval of architectural designs enabling faster permits, or experimenting with techniques and materials that would otherwise take decades to approve.

First-time seekers can choose a region, and specific plots are assigned by lottery, possibly with social benefit criteria — e.g., priority for those volunteering for military service.

Minimum unbuilt land quota

To ensure an adequate supply of buildable land and encourage the YIMBY effect, each municipality should be required to maintain at least 25% of its built-up area as unbuilt buildable land. If this quota drops below the threshold, the municipality must release more land.

Exceptions can apply to areas heavily dependent on tourism.

V. Jazbinšek 2.0

Apartments with non-profit rents, still owned by the state or municipalities, represent a frozen housing stock that rarely circulates. Tenants rarely move out, and rental rights are often informally passed within families.

This is understandable — why would someone leave a quality apartment in a good location at one-third the market rent?

This model is long-term inefficient and opaque. The state pays for maintenance, but never regains control or redistributes the housing effectively.

We propose offering these homes for sale to current tenants:

• At a fair discount, factoring in years lived, social status, and real value.
• With safeguards against immediate resale or speculation.

This would:

• Relieve the public administration of inefficient housing management.
• Ensure tenants’ long-term social security and affordability in retirement.
• Save the state long-term maintenance costs.

This is not a new idea. The original Jazbinšek law in the 1990s was hugely successful — around 160,000 people gained homes, ensuring housing security and stability.

The problem was not privatization itself, but that apartments were sold too cheaply.

Two models are possible:

• Classic improved privatization: the tenant gradually pays off the apartment through rent, becoming the owner after a set period. This system is fair, prevents sudden financial burdens, and encourages responsibility.
• Singapore’s rent-to-own model: the tenant gains lifetime usage rights, but ownership remains with the state. After the tenant’s death, the apartment returns to the housing pool.

Note: Slovenia’s housing success was also built on inflation-indexed loans — something that cannot be repeated today.

VI. Investments in better road networks

Infrastructure investments are long-term. Railways, highways, and tunnels are built not for today, but for the next 10, 20, or even 50 years.

If we believe that in a few decades autonomous electric vehicles will be widespread, the logic of mobility will fundamentally change. Such vehicles will be:

• Safer — eliminating human error and fatigue
• Accessible — usable by children, elderly, disabled
• Comfortable — enabling sleep, reading, or work during transit
• Efficient — coordinated by traffic algorithms
• Green — running on clean renewable electricity

In such a world, traditional public transport will become less essential. Instead, we will send cars to pick up others, share rides, or personalize our mobility.

Nevertheless, there is a strong current trend of investing heavily in traditional public transport — often framed as climate policy. But this may not be the most rational or long-term choice.

For example, railways are:

• Extremely expensive and slow to build and maintain
• Inflexible — requiring high traffic density along fixed corridors
• Centralized — reinforcing outdated development models
• Slow to adapt — infrastructure changes are costly and lengthy

Much of this investment happens because rail is currently seen as "green." But in a future dominated by electric, autonomous personal transport, that advantage disappears. The issues rail solves today — emissions and congestion — will be addressed by technology.

It’s wiser to invest in high-quality road and communication networks, creating infrastructure that is flexible, decentralized, future-proof, and technology-neutral.

VII. Transformation or abolition of housing funds

The state has established housing funds in Slovenia to increase the stock of public rental housing. In practice, however, this model is proving neither effective nor sensible.

Housing funds typically build no more than 600 apartments a year — a drop in the ocean compared to actual needs. Around 17,000 children are born in Slovenia each year, meaning even just covering new generations requires several times more housing. When accounting for childless couples, immigrants, singles, and the aging population, it's clear that these funds fail to meet even 5% of real demand.

In practice, it’s a housing lottery — only a lucky few benefit.

Moreover, housing funds often build in prime locations — city centers and high-value zones. This is problematic because:

• It adds pressure to already overheated property markets.
• It pushes out the middle class, who can no longer afford to buy there.
• The state competes with the market for contractors, raising costs for all.

Housing funds also take loans backed by government guarantees, meaning taxpayers bear the risk of failed projects. Meanwhile, many private investors — who could build faster and cheaper — have no access to such guarantees.

Despite all this, millions of euros flow into housing funds annually — for construction, interest, overhead, salaries, and project management — with negligible results. Public money is spread thin while almost no housing gets built.

Housing funds are also large bureaucracies with management, legal teams, commercial departments, investors, supervisors, and consultants. But the state is not a real estate agency. These tasks could be more efficiently handled by private or municipal providers already operating successfully in the market.

We propose:

• Gradual transformation or abolition of housing funds.
• Complete existing projects, but start no new ones.
• Reassign staff to the private sector or to a new, specialized state body focused solely on access to buildable land — today’s biggest obstacle to construction.

The state should focus where it’s truly needed: legislation, regulation, fair taxation, and opening land for development. Housing funds should be a thing of the past, not a permanent institutional market disruption.

VIII. Decentralization of the public sector

Most of Slovenia’s public sector is concentrated in a few urban centers, primarily Ljubljana. This includes ministries, government offices, agencies, universities, research institutes, hospitals, cultural institutions, and broadcasters.

This causes major issues:

• Overloaded roads, congestion, and traffic jams.
• Lack of parking and constant space conflicts.
• Higher construction costs in expensive central areas.
• Housing pressure: thousands of public employees want to live near work, driving up prices and pushing out families.

Meanwhile, other parts of Slovenia — rural areas, small towns, and regional outskirts — remain depopulated, opportunity-starved, and underutilized. We’ve built a system where people are forced to move where the state is, instead of the state going where the people are.

Public employees are generally well-educated and well-paid. Their presence in a town boosts local demand — for restaurants, hairdressers, preschools, housing, gyms, mechanics. In short, they support vibrant local life.

We propose a gradual relocation of public institutions across Slovenia. This doesn’t mean putting every agency in a village — but relocating offices, universities, and agencies to areas with good connections and available land, where people would gladly stay — if given employment.

To reduce housing pressures, we must reduce demand — and one of the biggest sources of that pressure is the state itself. The state should lead by example and move first.

Slovenia already uses tools to promote balanced settlement — through grants, EU funds, building restrictions, environmental limits, and spatial plans. But while citizens are expected to live “dispersedly,” the state behaves as though it can only exist in the capital.

A more fair, efficient, and meaningful approach would be for the state to respect the principle of balanced regional development — relieving pressure on major cities, reducing housing strain, and revitalizing lagging regions.

IX. Legalization of existing informal buildings

Slovenia has a long tradition of legalizing past unpermitted construction — either through presuming old permits or via dedicated legalization processes.

Meanwhile, citizens who today try to build legally still face long waits, consents, bureaucracy, and required documentation just to build a simple house. This system is unfair — it creates double standards:

• Some obtain occupancy permits effortlessly,
• while others can’t get one despite full compliance and effort.

Even the Constitutional Court now questions whether such legalizations violate the constitutional principle of equal treatment under the law.

We propose a more consistent and fair path:

• First, simplify the building code for everyone.
• Then legalize all existing structures that would comply under the new rules.

This way, all are treated equally — no retroactive privilege for past violations, and no punishment for future compliance.

What about those who built under stricter rules? They may feel uneasy, but this is not injustice — it’s progress. Just as no one receives a refund when taxes go down, this change means society moves forward — toward more accessible housing.

The legalization we propose is not about leniency, but normalization. We’re not correcting individual wrongdoing — we’re correcting unreasonable conditions that pushed people to violate rules in the first place.

X. Private microfunds and self-build cooperatives

Over recent decades, much has been said about Slovenia’s “housing miracle” — the fact that a large share of Slovenians own their homes. But this wasn’t due to state construction.

The Jazbinšek law privatized only around 160,000 dwellings — less than a quarter of all housing. Many of these weren’t publicly built anyway, but nationalized or confiscated homes from previous regimes.

The real foundation of Slovenia’s housing success was:

• Mass self-building in the 1960s–1980s,
• Family solidarity,
• Private initiative in creating homes.

That spirit of self-building — people building their own homes with effort and savings — is fading. Why?

• Crippling overregulation,
• Construction burdened by excessive rules and approvals,
• Mobility restrictions that prevent competitive suburbanization,
• No buildable land where people can afford to live,
• No room for community-based solutions.

These imbalances are increasingly recognized. The Chamber of Commerce recently noted:

• Procedures for state investors are faster than for private builders, often due to political pressure,
• State projects are exempt from utility charges, while private builders pay full price for the same infrastructure.

This creates a system where the state competes against its own citizens — unfairly, using far more resources and tools.

Slovenia must return space to private initiative — not through subsidies, but by removing obstacles.

When every hardworking person can build a home — or join others in creating a neighborhood — we’ll again witness a housing miracle. Not through law, but through freedom.

The core proposal is:

• Empowering local communities to organize housing themselves,
• Simplifying rules that currently hinder initiative,
• Removing the state as a market-distorting investor.

Private microfunds would be small, local initiatives by individuals or groups collecting resources to build homes in their area. These could be cooperatives, parent groups, village communities, unions, or companies for employees. They would build where they want to live — not where the state assigns quotas. Housing would be owned by the fund’s members, not rented from the state.

Self-build cooperatives would be neighborhoods built together by individuals. Each person builds their unit (e.g., house), while the group organizes roads, fences, water, sewage, and electricity. Costs drop significantly as there's no need for commercial investors. Everyone invests what they can afford. The cooperative may jointly source materials, share tools, exchange skills — reducing reliance on the market.

The state does not finance or build these private projects. But it ensures:

• Barriers are removed,
• Land division is simplified,
• Shared ownership and building permits are easy to obtain,
• Construction is allowed without full utility readiness if members commit to self-sufficiency (e.g., water tanks, solar panels, composting toilets),
• A legal framework supports safe co-investment and shared use.

Private microfunds and cooperatives are not experiments — they are a revival of what once worked in Slovenia. A society where the state builds a few hundred units a year will never solve housing for 25% of households — over a quarter million people.

A society that again trusts its people to build their own homes — can.

Slovenia: The Sick Man of Europe

Chapter I: Myth as mandate

In the 2010s, Russia revived the myth of the Great Patriotic War through a wave of high-budget films such as Stalingrad (2013), 28 Panfilov’s Men (2016), and T-34 (2018). These productions glorified Soviet heroism, whitewashed Stalinist crimes, and promoted a moral narrative of Russia as both savior and eternal victim.

In a revealing interview with Tucker Carlson, it became clear that Vladimir Putin had drawn inspiration from Slobodan Milošević’s performance at Gazimestan in 1989, where the myth of the Battle of Kosovo was weaponized for modern political ends.

These films did more than entertain—they laid the ideological foundation for the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, framed as an act of “denazification.” History was transformed into a tool of war; myth became mandate. Ironically, many Russians today are more convinced they are fighting fascism than they were in 1961, when they built the anti-fascist barrier—known in the West as the Berlin Wall.

Chapter II: Slovenia’s surprise turn

In recent months, Slovenia has made a series of radical and unexpected foreign policy moves that have stunned allies and observers alike. President Nataša Pirc Musar, elected as an independent but backed by the post-communist left, surprised many when she adopted the rhetoric of Hamas propaganda, accusing Israel of genocide in Gaza — a narrative closely aligned with Iranian, Russian, and hard-left agendas. While most EU member states sought a cautious and unified response to the Gaza conflict, Slovenia actively joined the group of outliers to unilaterally recognize Palestine in 2024, bypassing broader EU consensus.

Foreign Minister Tanja Fajon went even further, positioning Slovenia as one of the most pro-Hamas and pro-Iran voices in the EU, frequently breaking ranks with Western allies. Her ministry has supported anti-Israel resolutions at the UN and echoed Tehran’s language in official briefings. Fajon’s foreign policy stance has alarmed Western diplomats, especially as it coincides with renewed Russian outreach to non-aligned and destabilized regions—a pattern Slovenia now appears eager to emulate.

A revealing example of how this ideological shift has permeated even public media occurred during the Eurovision Song Contest. After Israeli entries received strong support from Slovenian viewers two years in a row, Slovenia’s state broadcaster RTV publicly called for Israel to be removed from the competition altogether. The move, framed as a protest against the war in Gaza, was widely criticized as politically motivated censorship. It also exposed the growing rift between the government’s ideological stance and the preferences of the broader Slovenian public, which had twice placed Israel among the top entries in the televote.

Most strikingly, Prime Minister Robert Golob—who rose to power in 2022 on promises of depoliticization and reform—raised the possibility of a referendum on Slovenia’s membership in NATO. Though later downplayed, the proposal echoed the kind of strategic ambiguity seen in Serbia’s “neutrality doctrine.” At the same time, Golob’s government has advocated for quiet diplomatic re-engagement with Russia, despite EU sanctions and the ongoing war in Ukraine.

In less than a year, Slovenia has shifted from a predictable mid-sized EU member to a rogue ideological outlier—undermining NATO unity, destabilizing EU foreign policy cohesion, and adopting the language of Iran, Russia, and Hamas. For a country that once helped lead the break from Yugoslav socialism, the pivot is as unexpected as it is revealing.

Chapter III: Not a surprise at all

Slovenia’s recent foreign policy radicalism—from unilaterally recognizing Palestine to floating a NATO referendum—is not an isolated deviation. The surprise lies only in how long the outside world failed to notice. It is the inevitable externalization of an internal ideological project that has been reshaping the country for years. The same actors now adopting the language of Hamas, Iran, and Russia on the global stage have been transforming Slovenia’s institutions at home, slowly but decisively, under the pretense of reform and depoliticization.

Prime Minister Robert Golob’s government, elected in 2022 has overseen one of the most aggressive political and cultural reconsolidations since independence. Beneath the rhetoric of modernization lies an unmistakable pattern: the restoration of a post-communist elite consensus through institutional capture, myth-based legitimacy, and proxy radicalism.

• The judiciary has been systematically co-opted, culminating in the de facto takeover of the Constitutional Court.
• The country’s public broadcaster, RTV Slovenija, has undergone what can only be described as a purge of dissenting journalists.
• NGOs with ideological agendas and foreign funding have infiltrated ministries and policymaking bodies without electoral legitimacy.
• A referendum on privileged cultural pensions seeks to restore Yugoslav-era hierarchies favoring regime-loyal intellectuals.
• The National Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Communism was canceled, erasing inconvenient historical truths.

Each of these measures is part of a consistent strategy: to retake ideological control of the state, not by persuasion or democratic debate, but by reshaping the institutions themselves—their personnel, their functions, and their memory. These developments cannot be understood as pragmatic politics. They reflect a coherent ideological worldview—one that fuses post-socialist nostalgia with anti-Western sentiment, moral relativism, and selective historical memory. The project is neither liberal nor conservative—it is restorationist. Its purpose is to reestablish the ideological dominance of the Partisan myth and the accompanying narrative of benevolent, enlightened communism. Together, these myths serve to legitimize the cultural authority of the old elite and to exclude ideological competitors through administrative means, not open discourse.

Chapter IV: A shared script — myth, memory, and control

What we are witnessing in Slovenia is not an isolated phenomenon, but part of a broader post-authoritarian strategy also seen in Russia and Serbia: the construction of a national identity rooted not in civic democracy or human rights, but in a carefully curated, emotionalized mythology of war and moral victory. These myths are not spontaneous—they are institutionally maintained and used to justify the political status quo.

In Slovenia, the dominant myth is not just the NOB (National Liberation Struggle), but the broader narrative of benevolent communism. This framing allows the events of 1991—the democratic rupture, the rejection of one-party rule, the war of independence—to be pushed to the periphery, recast as a mere continuation of the “liberation” struggle rather than a break with it.

• It legitimizes the continued dominance of the old elite, who portray themselves as guardians of antifascist values rather than former ideologues of a failed regime.
• It delegitimizes 1991 as a foundational moment, stripping it of its trauma, its courage, and its radical departure from dictatorship.

Much like Russia, where WWII is used to justify war and erase Stalinist crimes, and Serbia, where the Kosovo myth and selective Yugoslav nostalgia are mobilized to maintain political ambiguity, Slovenia too has transformed its memory politics into a mechanism of cultural control.

Meanwhile, post-communist states like Poland, the Baltic countries, and Czechia followed a radically different path. They explicitly named both fascist and communist totalitarianism as illegitimate. They introduced lustration, truth commissions, and public education rooted in accountability and transparency. Their founding myth is 1989 or 1991—not 1945. In Slovenia, by contrast, the past is not reckoned with—it is rerun.

Memory politics since 1990: A timeline comparison

Decade	Russia	Slovenia	Serbia	Poland / Czechia / Baltics
1990s	Shock & fragmentation after USSR collapse. Yeltsin-era chaos. No clear narrative.	Democratic breakthrough (1990–1992). 1991 war of independence is framed as a rupture with communism.	Collapse of Yugoslavia. Wars in Croatia/Bosnia. Conflicting narratives: Chetniks vs. Partisans.	Lustration, truth commissions. Strong emphasis on decommunization. Clear rupture with the past.
2000–2010	Putin rises (2000). Centralization. WWII reframed as sacred. Stalin rehabilitated.	NOB re-legitimized by left-wing elites. Museums, schoolbooks focus on WWII, not 1991.	Rehabilitation of WWII Chetniks begins under nationalism. Kosovo conflict dominates national trauma.	Public trials of communist crimes. Strong anti-communist education. Genocide museums and archives.
2010–2020	Big-budget WWII films. "Russkiy mir" ideology. USSR crimes omitted.	Downplaying of 1991 continues. Left resists naming communism as dictatorship.	Continued myth duality. Titoist nostalgia vs. Orthodox nationalism. Little historical reckoning.	EU integration solidifies anti-communist identity. Soviet occupation is central historical frame.
2020–present	Ukraine war justified using WWII symbols. “Denazification” rhetoric. Myth weaponized.	Attempt to merge 1945 and 1991 into one myth. Museum of Independence dismantled in 2023.	Vučić promotes “neutral Serbia” doctrine. Avoids full break with Yugoslav past.	Continued democratic memory culture. Museums, education, and archives reinforce truth and rupture.

Chapter V: The Thompson concert in Croatia: 1991 vs. 1945 as moral ground zero

On July 5, 2025, singer Marko Perković Thompson held what became the largest single-night concert in Croatian history—over 500,000 people gathered at Zagreb’s Hippodrome, waving flags, singing songs of national pride, and commemorating the Croatian struggle for independence.

Thompson’s music is rooted in the 1991–1995 Homeland War, not in World War II or Ustaša mythology, as detractors often claim. His lyrics speak of loss, sacrifice, and national survival—themes drawn from lived Croatian experience, not historical revisionism.

And yet, international and regional media—particularly those influenced by former Yugoslav-era structures—quickly framed the concert as a revival of World War II fascism, ignoring its actual context. This misrepresentation is not accidental. It reflects a broader effort by the old Yugoslav elite to reinterpret post-communist patriotism through a 1945 lens, where any national sentiment not anchored in the Partisan myth is automatically branded extremist.

In that sense, Thompson is not the myth—he is a victim of it. His popularity illustrates the unresolved tension between two competing visions of history: one that sees 1991 as the foundation of modern sovereignty, and another that clings to 1945 as the sole moral reference point.

In Slovenia, this tension is even more suppressed. Celebrating the 1991 independence movement too loudly often invites suspicion. Expressing pride in the national struggle is easily dismissed as nationalist revisionism. This is why Slovenia lacks cultural equivalents of Thompson—not due to extremism, but because the post-communist elite fears any narrative that might displace the WWII myth as the cornerstone of national identity.

Even as Croatia publicly debates its historical ambiguities, Slovenia enforces a sanitized narrative, suppressing 1991 in favor of a curated image of the Partisan state—repackaged and sold as a liberal democracy.

Chapter VI: Conclusion — Slovenia’s strategic drift

Slovenia’s internal mythmaking and institutional capture are no longer a domestic affair. They are shaping the country’s foreign policy, undermining democratic norms, and placing Slovenia increasingly at odds with its EU partners.

More alarmingly, Slovenia is becoming a test case—a soft target—for Russia’s broader strategy of fragmenting the West from within. By leveraging historical grievances, ideological nostalgia, and captured institutions, Russia is using Slovenia as a tool to seed or initiate more extremist ruptures inside the EU and NATO.

This is not just symbolic. If one EU or NATO country begins to seriously consider withdrawal—especially under the influence of disinformation, media manipulation, and foreign-funded activism—it could open the gates of hell. It would signal that the post-1991 democratic order is reversible, that narrative warfare can succeed where tanks could not.

But the consequences go beyond geopolitics. As Slovenia doubles down on ideological restoration, it is also beginning to lag economically and socially. The country is stagnating in innovation, productivity, and global relevance. In this climate, the greatest enemy is not the political opposition—it is the free market, meritocracy, and openness.

Slovenia does not need condemnation - it is too small and irrelevant for that. It needs attention. From allies, from watchdogs, and from its own democratic opposition. Pressure from the free world, combined with domestic civic resistance, could help Slovenia rediscover the promise of 1991: an open, modern, democratic society built on truth rather than myth.

Rather than drifting toward the ideological orbit of Iran, Russia, and Serbia, Slovenia would benefit enormously from deepening its ties with the liberal, economically open, and strategically sober nations of Central Europe. A closer alignment with the Visegrád Group and the Baltic States — could anchor Slovenia in a reality-based policy framework, helping it move forward rather than backward.

When doubt becomes denial: The radicalization of the left in Slovenia

In the absence of effective solutions to complex socio-economic challenges, the political left in Slovenia appears to be undergoing significant radicalization. Criticism is no longer reserved for ideological opponents but is increasingly directed at anyone who does not fully align with a narrowly defined set of beliefs.

People with differing opinions are often categorized into various forms of "deniers": climate change deniers, science deniers, genocide deniers, equality deniers. In many cases, however, these individuals are not denying facts but expressing skepticism about whether proposed policies will yield meaningful improvements.

There is a long-standing tradition within leftist movements to justify the restriction of individual freedoms in the name of the common good. This is often coupled with the assumption that policies will always function as intended—an assumption that, in practice, frequently proves false.

Not long ago, those who raised concerns about the technical limitations of the electric grid were labeled climate change deniers. Today, Slovenia is facing high electricity distribution charges, suggesting those concerns were not without merit.

Even center-left figures like Borut Pahor have come under fire—simply for stating that the war in Gaza does not meet the current legal definition of genocide. Ironically, international efforts are now underway to amend that very definition, indicating a recognition of its limitations.

It is perhaps to be expected that, for those accustomed to ideological certainty, any dissent may feel like denial. What is more troubling is how widespread this mindset has become in Slovenia, in contrast to much of the rest of the EU.

This growing radicalism not only damages the quality of public discourse and social cohesion within Slovenia but also undermines the country's credibility and standing on the international stage. A more pluralistic and self-critical approach would serve both Slovenia and its global reputation far better.

Call to the Government of the Republic of Slovenia: Proposal to Reform EU Nature Directives

Subject: Proposal to amend EU legislation on the Natura 2000 network due to the disproportionate burden on Slovenia

Dear Government of the Republic of Slovenia,

In line with the national interest in the development of rural areas, agriculture, forestry, and spatial planning, I am submitting a proposal that the Government of the Republic of Slovenia initiate a formal request—within the Council of the European Union and other relevant EU institutions—for an amendment to the Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC) and the Birds Directive (2009/147/EC).

Background:

• Slovenia has more than 37% of its national territory designated as part of the Natura 2000 network—the highest proportion among all EU member states (excluding a few small island nations).
• Such a large extent of restrictions exceeds a reasonable and proportionate scope of nature protection and seriously hinders development and land use across a significant portion of the country.
• Comparative analysis shows that countries such as Germany (15.4%), France (12.9%), the Netherlands (13.3%), and Denmark (8.4%) bear a much lower burden, even though they also fulfill the obligations under the same directives.
• While the directives do not define a fixed percentage of land to be included in Natura 2000, and rely on scientific criteria, it is clear that some countries—particularly those joining the EU in the 2000s—underwent excessive and indiscriminate designation.

Proposed actions:

1. The Government of Slovenia should propose amendments to the aforementioned directives, with the aim of:
   • introducing a recommended upper limit for Natura 2000 coverage (e.g., 15% of national territory),
   • allowing the phased removal or adjustment of sites that no longer serve conservation goals,
   • enabling more flexible management of areas exceeding that threshold.
2. The government should initiate diplomatic dialogue with other similarly affected member states—such as Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria—with the goal of forming a coalition for reform of EU conservation legislation.
3. If such reforms are rejected, the government should:
   • conduct a systematic review of all existing Natura 2000 sites in Slovenia,
   • identify areas that no longer meet scientific criteria,
   • and initiate the formal delisting process through the European Commission.

Conclusion:

Slovenia should no longer remain trapped by its own overly strict interpretation of European law. Nature protection is essential, but it must be based on the principles of proportionality, fair burden-sharing, and real-world effectiveness.

I therefore call on the Government of the Republic of Slovenia to safeguard the public interest, balance conservation objectives with spatial development needs, and begin the process of fair and necessary reform of European nature legislation.

Sincerely,
Tomaz Stih.

Towards a New Freedom of Living: Legalizing Vehicle Dwelling for Digital Nomads and the Unhoused

Amendments to the Public Order Act (ZJRM-1)

Article 1 (Amendment to Article 10)

The existing Article 10 is supplemented with new paragraphs 2 through 8, which read:

(2) Overnight stays or dwelling in vehicles in public parking areas is permitted if:

• it does not disturb public order or peace,
• no external equipment is deployed (awnings, tables, chairs, grills, cookers, etc.),
• the same vehicle is not parked in the same place for more than five consecutive days,
• the vehicle is properly registered and roadworthy according to motor vehicle regulations,
• after five days, the same vehicle must not return to that parking location for at least fourteen consecutive days, to prevent circumvention by temporarily leaving and returning.

(3) For the purposes of this article, “dwelling in a vehicle” means temporary or longer-term sleeping, resting, or living in a vehicle without external impacts on the surroundings. Such use shall not be considered camping under Article 18 of this Act.

(4) Vehicle dwelling is prohibited in the following locations:

• lawns, parks, and public walking areas,
• areas designated by municipalities as non-permissible for overnight stays,
• natural and cultural heritage sites or protected areas, where prohibited by special legislation.

(5) If the conditions in paragraphs (2) and (3) are met, such vehicle dwelling shall not be considered a public order offense or illegal camping, and is permitted without additional restrictions, except those listed in paragraph (4).

(6) A vehicle used for dwelling must be registered and technically sound. Deregistered, partially disassembled, or clearly unroadworthy vehicles shall not be considered suitable for dwelling under this Act.

(7) A municipality or parking operator (including concessionaires) may provide access to utility hookups (electricity, water, waste disposal), but shall not make vehicle hookup a requirement for the right to park and dwell. Use of such hookups must remain voluntary and may not serve as a precondition for overnight stays.

(8) For the purposes of this Act, a public parking area means any surface owned by the municipality or state intended for general vehicle use, regardless of operator. Parking lots designated solely for residents or specific buildings (e.g. apartment blocks) are not considered public.

Article 2 (Amendment to Article 18)

The title of Article 18 is changed to:

(Camping and external use of space)

Two new paragraphs are added:

(2) Without prejudice to Article 10, camping shall only be considered to occur when external equipment or surrounding space is used (awnings, chairs, cookers, etc.) or when the vehicle serves as an overnight shelter in locations where this is not explicitly permitted, and the conditions of Article 10 are not met.

(3) Vehicle dwelling without external influence that complies with Article 10 shall not be considered camping and is allowed on public parking areas, unless a municipal ordinance explicitly prohibits it under the 33% limit set in Article 31.

Article 3 (Addition of new Article 31 – Transitional provisions)

A new Article 31 is added:

Article 31 (Ensuring access to vehicle dwelling)

(1) All municipalities must, within 6 months of this Act’s entry into force, define by ordinance which parking areas prohibit vehicle dwelling. If no ordinance is adopted in time, it shall be considered that vehicle dwelling is allowed on all public parking areas under that municipality’s jurisdiction in accordance with this Act.

(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), municipalities must ensure that dwelling in vehicles under Article 10 is allowed on at least 33% of all public parking areas within their territory. This requirement is binding and may not be overridden, reduced, or reinterpreted.

(2a) Municipalities may designate paid zones for vehicle dwelling. In such cases, at least 50% of the areas under paragraph (2) must be available free of charge or for a symbolic fee. Prices must not be discriminatory, must be clearly defined and publicly posted in advance, and must reflect actual maintenance costs.

(3) If a municipality fails to meet these obligations, it shall be considered that vehicle dwelling is permitted on all public parking areas within its jurisdiction until a compliant ordinance is adopted.

Article 4 (Entry into force)

This Act shall enter into force fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia.

Explanation

The purpose of these amendments is to:

• enable the right to live in vehicles for social, economic, or lifestyle reasons,
• clearly distinguish between respectful vehicle dwelling and unauthorized camping,
• prevent unjust punishment and harassment of individuals who live peacefully in their vehicles,
• ensure that municipalities cannot arbitrarily restrict such dwelling without clear and transparent regulation,
• prevent misuse of public areas by unregistered or unsafe vehicles,
• prevent covert exclusion through compulsory hookups or excessive pricing,
• block circumvention of the five-day limit by short-term relocations,
• ensure fair and shared use of urban space, with a balanced mix of paid and free parking for vehicle dwellers.

On Inequality: What Gini Doesn't Tell Us

The combination of wage leveling through progressive income taxes and low property taxes ends up taxing the process of getting wealthy, not actual wealth. This kind of policy weakens motivation for productive work, limits upward mobility, and ironically fuels long-term wealth inequality.

Equality of income and wealth is a desirable goal for any society—but it matters deeply how we achieve it. Healthy equality comes when we empower people to be creative and productive, so that anyone who puts in a reasonable amount of effort can secure a decent life and a chance to grow.

This kind of organic, self-driven equality isn’t captured by metrics like the Gini coefficient. For example, if people can, through hard work, build a home, support a family, take vacations, and educate their children—then it really doesn’t matter if ten people in the country are billionaires. That kind of wealth inequality may actually inspire others to strive and achieve more.

But when inequality stems from artificial scarcity—like restricted housing construction that drives prices up and leaves half a million Slovenians without homes—or from limited access to professions due to state-protected monopolies, it becomes dangerous. It stifles growth, creates existential pressure, and erodes social stability.

The state should promote healthy equality—through free markets, open access to capital and innovation, fair competition, and ensuring basic goods are accessible to everyone. What we should avoid is the unhealthy kind of equality imposed through progressive taxes, bans, monopolies, nationalization, and other socialist-style policies that distort incentives and limit opportunity.

The Free Settlements Act (ZSN-1) Proposal: A New Vision for Independent Living in Slovenia

Article 1: Purpose

This law establishes the conditions for creating Free Settlements, where individuals and families can freely, responsibly, and innovatively build their own homes without unnecessary bureaucratic obstacles.

Article 2: Definition of a Free Settlement

A Free Settlement is an area that:

• is designated by a decision of the competent ministry,
• is intended for individual construction for personal housing needs,
• is limited to a maximum of 1,000 residents and no more than 300 residential units.

Article 3: Provision of Land

Land for Free Settlements is provided by the state from the fund of state forests and lands.

Settlements must be located within reasonable proximity to urban centers, generally no more than 30 minutes' drive from city centers.

Article 4: Accessibility of Free Settlements

The state must ensure that, in each statistical region, unoccupied land is available in Free Settlements sufficient to house at least 5% of the region's population.

Unoccupied land must be ready for allocation without additional spatial planning procedures.

Article 5: Right of Use

The right to use land is granted to an individual as a lifelong residential right.

This right can only be transferred to a legal partner or direct descendants, provided they continue to permanently reside on the plot.

The right of use is non-transferable to third parties and cannot be freely sold.

The user may, at their own request, exchange the right of use for land in another Free Settlement, with the consent of both parties.

Article 6: Priority Allocation

Priority is given to:

• individuals who have completed military service for the Republic of Slovenia,
• professional firefighters and rescuers,
• housing seekers without property ownership.

Remaining land is allocated through a public call, without discrimination.

Article 6.a: Land Allocation by Lottery

If there are multiple eligible candidates in the same priority group for land in a settlement, the selection is made by public lottery.

The micro-location of individual plots within the Free Settlement is also determined by public lottery.

The lottery is conducted by the competent state authority in a transparent, public, and verifiable manner.

Article 7: Construction

Construction does not require a building permit. It is sufficient to notify the start of construction with a basic description of the building and a declaration of responsibility for its stability and safety.

Article 8: Plot

Each residential unit is entitled to a plot size between 300 and 600 m².

The minimum distance between buildings is 3 meters, unless neighbors agree otherwise.

Article 9: Materials and Technologies

The use of all natural, recycled, or experimental materials without industrial certifications is permitted. Alternative building techniques and residential designs are allowed. The builder is solely responsible for the durability, safety, and functionality of their construction.

Article 10: Infrastructure and Land Development

The state provides basic external infrastructure to the settlement’s boundary, which includes:

• an access road,
• electrical supply,
• water connection,
• basic telecommunications connection.

The cost of basic infrastructure is covered by a one-time contribution or installment payments, up to a maximum of €10,000 per residential unit.

If commercial services are voluntarily established within the settlement, the state may proportionally reduce the overall utility contribution for residents.

Article 10.a: Internal Infrastructure of Free Settlements

Internal infrastructure (internal roads, paths, communal spaces) may be established and maintained voluntarily by the residents. The state does not manage the internal infrastructure, except to ensure minimal safety.

Article 10.b: Commercial Land in Free Settlements

When planning Free Settlements, the state must allocate between 2% and 5% of the total settlement area for commercial land. This land is intended for basic services for residents, such as shops, kindergartens, healthcare services, postal points, hospitality, and other forms of local supply.

Commercial land is leased through a public auction for a concession granted for a specified period, typically 30 years. The right to use commercial land is non-transferable without the consent of the competent authority and reverts to the state after the concession expires.

Article 11: Use of Dwellings

The user must reside permanently on the plot. Leasing to third parties is allowed only if the user remains permanently present and the primary residential purpose is maintained.

Article 12: Termination of Right of Use

The right of use terminates:

• with the permanent cessation of residence,
• in the case of severe environmental damage or damage to communal infrastructure,
• with permanent change of land use contrary to residential purposes.

Upon termination of the right of use, the user is entitled to a proportional refund of the paid utility contribution:

• less than 5 years of residence: 80% refund,
• 5–10 years of residence: 50% refund,
• more than 10 years of residence: no refund.

Article 13: Encouraging Innovation

Free Settlements are zones for the free experimentation of innovative residential technologies. The state does not prescribe the form, materials, or construction methods, except for basic safety principles.

Article 14: Special Status

Free Settlements hold the status of special public interest. Local authorities cannot prevent their establishment through spatial acts, ordinances, or referendums.

Article 14.a: Priority Over Other Regulations

The establishment of Free Settlements on land owned by the Republic of Slovenia is carried out directly under this law, regardless of the provisions of other regulations, including those concerning spatial planning, environmental protection, forest conservation, agricultural land, or state-owned real estate management.

Spatial acts, plans, protective regimes, and other regulations do not apply to Free Settlements unless explicitly provided by this law. The decision to establish a Free Settlement serves as the legal basis for changing land use and for all land registry procedures.

Article 15: Transitional Provisions

The Government of the Republic of Slovenia shall adopt the first program for establishing Free Settlements within six months after this law comes into effect.

Article 16: Validity

This law shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following its publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia.

Crossing the Rubicon: Slovenia at a Turning Point

Slovenia is approaching a pivotal moment. This Friday, the courts are expected to deliver a verdict in what is now the third high-profile trial targeting the leader of the opposition, Janez Janša. Many observers see these proceedings as politically motivated, and this time, the context feels fundamentally different. The patience of the opposition — and of many citizens — has been tested more than once. A third such attempt, especially so close to next year’s parliamentary elections, risks being viewed not just as a legal matter, but as a direct challenge to the democratic process itself.

All current public opinion polls suggest that Janez Janša would be the likely winner of the upcoming elections. Any perception that judicial decisions are being used to influence or preempt this outcome would cast a long shadow over the legitimacy of the democratic system. If this process is seen as an effort to pre-determine election results, it could become a defining moment in our political history — Slovenia’s own October 7. While not as violent or dramatic as events elsewhere, the political consequences could be equally profound.

Should the current government continue down a path marked by concentrated media control, the marginalization of opposition voices, and dominance over all branches of power, the consequences may be lasting. Our country could face a deepening divide, a "before" and "after" moment that alters public trust irreversibly. History shows us how fragile peace can be — just as October 7 forever changed the Israeli perception of coexistence, Slovenia risks losing something equally vital: faith in the possibility of peaceful, democratic change.

Unlike a decade ago, when a similar trial took place, this time the geopolitical environment is different. International audiences are more alert to the dangers of democratic backsliding, especially in Europe. Across the continent, the political right — often accused of undermining democratic norms — is unlikely to remain silent if yet another one of its leading figures is perceived to be targeted unjustly, particularly when that figure is leading in national polls.

This is why now, more than ever, we must choose dialogue over division, and democratic integrity over short-term political gain. Let this be an appeal to those in power: for the sake of national unity and stability, resist the urge to escalate. Calm rhetoric, a fair judicial process, and respect for democratic pluralism must prevail.

Slovenia does not need a political crisis that spirals into unrest or — in the worst case — lays the groundwork for widespread revolt or internal conflict. We do not want to become a country where belief in justice fades, and only force or protest seems to hold sway.

Let democracy work. Let the people decide their future in free and fair elections, without interference or manipulation. That is the only way forward — toward peace, prosperity, and a stronger, more resilient Slovenia.

Our Staged Democracy: Slovenia’s Theresienstadt and the EU’s Complicity

A closer look at how democratic institutions in Slovenia were hollowed out—while Brussels applauded the performance.

Three years ago, events in Slovenia took a deeply troubling turn.

Those of us who understood the true state of affairs watched in dismay as well-funded lobbyists portrayed a reality in direct contradiction to what was actually unfolding in the country. While socialists had already secured control over the judiciary and were orchestrating politically motivated show trials against the opposition, they portrayed themselves in Brussels as victims of social media posts on Twitter.

Despite already dominating nearly all major media outlets in Slovenia, they pointed to a small opposition outlet with only 2% market reach as a supposed threat to democracy. Efforts to diversify the media space—so that voices beyond the socialist establishment could be heard—were cynically framed as attempts to hijack the media.

In this context, European commissioners with sympathies toward socialist ideologies, such as Věra Jourová and Sophie in ’t Veld, actively participated in the erosion of democracy and freedom in Slovenia. Under the banner of the “rule of law,” Brussels endorsed the subjugation of all branches of Slovenian government to socialist control.

As a result, socialists now hold not only the judiciary and the Constitutional Court, but also the presidency, the government, the national assembly, and more than 90% of the media landscape. This political imbalance is the inevitable outcome of a historical reality: in the past 80 years, right-leaning governments in Slovenia have held power for less than a tenth of that time. For the remaining nine-tenths, all levers of authority have remained in the hands of various socialist administrations.

This letter, presented today by former chairman of the programming council of RTV Slovenia, Peter Gregorčič, to the fact-finding delegation of the European People’s Party, sheds light on the stage-managed backdrop of our own Theresienstadt—illustrated through the case of the now-captured public broadcaster and the Constitutional Court.

Long Live Free Construction, Damn It!

More Real Cement and Less Ideological Cement.

Stories about how we once ate bark to build our houses are amusing, but they are not instructive. Unfortunately, exact figures for Slovenia are not available, but comparable data from abroad show that housing is currently the least affordable it has been in the past 150 years. This means that experiences from the previous century are useless in this one, as building a house or buying an apartment was much easier back then than it is today.

The reason for the housing shortage and the long-term decline in homeownership among households lies in the misguided priorities of our governments. Instead of unleashing the creative forces in society and turning Slovenia into a construction site, it fights against creation and tries to solve problems through class struggle.

Because it dislikes entrepreneurship and private initiative, the ruling politics force us to choose between housing for young families, AirBNB tourism, or real estate investment—when in fact, we need all three for the future. Because it does not believe in the harm caused by excessive spatial and construction regulations, it searches for "saboteurs of the working people," blaming them for the housing shortage—our neighbors who dared to inherit, build, or even invest in more than one property. And it plans their expropriation with a new tax that, by exempting the first property instead of providing a general tax relief on its value, violates the fundamental principle of horizontal tax fairness—that people with equally valued properties should pay the same tax.

It is high time that, alongside the devalued concepts of sustainability, equality, and decarbonization, we inject some common sense into our housing policy.

A Thousand Times Nothing Killed the Donkey.

Let's make a provocative back-of-the-envelope calculation. Since independence, despite emigration, Slovenia's population has increased by approximately 130,000, while household size has decreased by half a person per household. These numbers mean that to maintain the same level of housing supply since independence, Slovenia would have had to build about 190,000 new apartments. This is not an argument against immigration—at least not useful immigration—but it is a motivation to consider whether our spatial and construction regulations allow for fast and large-scale housing construction to meet current needs. And a hint for those seriously considering this: "No."

If we take into account other factors, such as the shift in settlement patterns due to the centralization of the state and the ideological-political resistance to comfortable and economical personal transportation on beautiful and wide roads (which previously alleviated this issue), as well as increasingly stringent spatial and construction laws that have caused a real housing recession— leading to only half as many homes being built in the last decade compared to the previous one— then current housing prices are neither an enigma nor a conspiracy. They simply reflect the supply- demand ratio created by these restrictions.

There are simply too few homes. Politicians' dreams of vacant apartments that can just be fairly redistributed through taxation, solving everything, are as naïve as relying on abandoned railway tracks for a functioning transport infrastructure. For things to change, young people must stop believing that politics can solve this problem for them and instead demand that politics stop throwing obstacles in their way when they try to solve it themselves.

The answer to the question of how the shortage arose can be found in an ancient story about a father and son who tried to bring as many small items as possible down the valley on a donkey. Each kept piling on more until, in the end, the donkey collapsed and died. The moral of the story is: "A thousand times nothing killed the donkey."

This "nothing" that we have been piling onto the housing donkey every year since independence consists of spatial regulations, construction regulations, and government interventions in the market that prevent it from responding quickly enough to the population's needs. To enable fast and economical construction of new housing, we must abandon some harmful dogmas and practices on which the current complicated, expensive, and above all, dysfunctional system of housing supply is based.

"Let's Destroy All Nature."

First, we need to stop being afraid that we will "destroy all nature." I understand that politics scares us with the need to preserve at least some untouched nature for future generations, that farmland must be protected for self-sufficiency, and that forests are our greatest treasure. But these fears are unfounded. Slovenia is very large, and throughout millennia, we have managed to build on less than 4% of its land, including all buildings and infrastructure. More than 96% of our country remains unbuilt, and even if every household without a home tomorrow claimed 500 m² of land, it would require less than half a percent of Slovenia’s total area.

We do not need to ban dispersed construction, nor do we need to mandate the use of degraded land before releasing new land, nor should we pursue ideological environmental goals like the government's declared "0% net developable land" policy. The impact of home and apartment construction on these concerns is negligible. If we want cheap land in well-connected locations where it is economical to build, we must significantly increase the supply of developable land. And since this quantity is determined not by the market but by the state, all we need for lower land prices is political will.

Housing is Not a Human Right – A Shovel and a Concrete Mixer Are.

In the past, people could build homes according to their abilities—on cheap land, on their own, with the help of family and friends. Once the house was habitable, they moved in to avoid rent and finished construction gradually. Since then, we have managed to ban or significantly restrict all these useful practices. Due to social partners' demands to combat illegal work, we have banned family and friend assistance. Under the pretense of safety concerns, we have overregulated simple family home projects to the point where self-building, which was once feasible for workers with an eighth-grade education, has become too complex even for highly educated people—not technically, but legally and bureaucratically. Moving into a house without an occupancy permit is now strictly punished with fines, and state-owned utility companies even help enforce this by cutting off water and electricity "for your safety."

The previous generation was able to lower the cost of their homes with compromise solutions that are no longer allowed today. For example, if certain utilities were not available on a plot of land and therefore made it cheaper, people built rainwater collection tanks and septic tanks. They could choose cheaper insulation and heating systems better suited to their circumstances. Today, such practices are either blocked at the spatial planning stage, made difficult by the building permit process, or outright banned.

We are still among the wealthier countries in the region. Prefabricated houses from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia are still affordable for Slovenian households with an average salary.However, our construction regulations prevent us from building them. If you somehow manage to adapt such a house to meet all our technical requirements and it still remains affordable, then some last-minute bureaucratic nonsense will stop you anyway—perhaps a zoning requirement specifying the allowed color of the facade or the permitted roof slope and type.

And if all of this seems truly ridiculous to you, and you believe that a family should have a home of their own choosing and not one dictated by neighbors or people who lived in the region 300 years ago, then—they will explain to you that you are just a Gypsy from Rakova Jelša.

"Long Live Socialist Yugoslavia, and Down with Socialism!"

Young people today rightly ask why workers can no longer build their homes when they actually could in Yugoslavia. The answer is not socialism. Three out of four homes in Yugoslavia were not built by the state but by the people themselves. The Jazbinšek Law privatized only 160,000 state apartments—today, Slovenia has 865,000 apartments. The reason people were so creative lies in Yugoslavia’s informal construction liberalism. Older communists knew, unlike the younger ones, that socialism is something you talk about, not something you actually do, and that people need to survive the state’s care. Ironically, the former totalitarian system was less repressive about breaking irrational rules than today’s democracy—resulting in one in seven buildings being illegal at the time of independence.

It’s the Regulation, Stupid.

Today's spatial and construction restrictions are mostly written by detached ideologues at the behest of lobbyists. They are designed for a specific class of people who can afford them, while everyone else is blocked from home ownership by the ban on cheaper alternatives. If you disagree and believe these regulations are well-intentioned, ask yourself: How is it that the same people who regulate your carport for "safety" never thought to require fire escapes and alarms in school dormitories—still unregulated in Slovenia?

Our constitution states that the state creates conditions for everyone to obtain suitable housing. A housing policy in line with this should focus on the cost of new housing and evaluate all regulations by their impact on affordability.

Perhaps after independence, EU accession, NATO membership, and adopting the euro, it’s time for a new goal: enabling every Slovenian to build their own home by removing unnecessary obstacles and rewriting spatial, construction, and environmental laws from scratch—simply enough for everyone to understand. By doing so, we won’t just improve housing access but also boost demographics and social security for all.

Liberty Settlements: Reclaiming Land, Restoring Hope

The Five Delusions Driving Slovenia’s Failing Housing Policy

The amendment to the housing act focuses primarily on strengthening the public rental market and state interventionism in the housing sector. Both have been seen by the socialist government as remedies for decades—remedies that never work. Yet they are so fond of them that with every term, they increase the dosage, hoping that this time it will be different. Now, in addition to their traditional measures, they are proposing a ban on individuals using platforms like Airbnb as small businesses, stripping countless families of an important source of supplementary income. At the same time, they plan to spend billions on building vast complexes of state-owned apartments, designed to make people increasingly dependent on government handouts—primarily targeting second-generation migrants as one their main client bases. Let’s outline five main delusions of this snake oil for our housing market.

The first delusion crept into our housing policy from the previous system. Back then, some people received state-owned apartments, and many of them still believe today that in Slovenia, everyone got their own property thanks to the so-called Jazbinšek Law. But the numbers tell a different story. Under that law, 160,000 contracts were signed, yet Slovenia has 864,000 dwellings. For every Jazbinšek apartment, five private single-family houses were built before and during socialism. Today, two out of three Slovenians live in those houses. Our housing prosperity doesn't rest on "Tito’s" socialist apartments but on single-family homes that people built themselves.

The second delusion is the belief that we need to create a state fund of non-profit rental apartments, which would then “circulate” among those who need them. It hardly needs explaining that moving into a state-owned, non-profit apartment is like winning the lottery for the average Janez Slehernik; once there, he’ll stay forever and try to pass the right down to his descendants. As a result, circulation in practice never happens.

The third delusion is that the state will solve young people’s housing problems by building state-owned apartments with non-profit rents. With an average of 200 new state apartments per year and a generation of 17,000 young people annually, this is utterly unrealistic. If we consider that the average cost of the apartments currently being built by the national housing fund is now close to 300,000 euros per unit, a serious expansion that would shorten waiting lists within our lifetimes would be financially unsustainable—it would cost as much as building a second railway track each year.

The fourth delusion is the claim that there are too few non-profit rental apartments. This statement is based on international comparisons, which indeed show a low percentage of non-profit rentals relative to all dwellings. But this makes sense because from the equation “all dwellings = owner-occupied dwellings + rental dwellings,” it follows that in a country where most housing is privately owned, the share of rental housing will naturally be lower. Therefore, the percentage of non-profit rentals among them doesn’t tell us much. What’s more important is how many tenants are paying non-profit versus market rents. It turns out that for every resident exposed to market rent in Slovenia, there are three in non-profit or subsidized rentals. As a result, Slovenia is already at the top globally for the percentage of non-profit rental housing among all rental housing.

The fifth delusion is that by promoting the rental market, we’ll solve social problems. The rental market is a tool to increase population mobility, making us more competitive. A healthy rental market provides people with additional choices, not the only way to find a place to live. The last thing we want in twenty years is retirees with €890 pensions paying two thirds of it in rent because they remained renters their entire lives.

It's the Price, Stupid!

If we want a functioning housing market, we need to focus on one key goal instead of chasing utopian dreams and lofty ambitions: lowering the cost of building new housing.

To achieve this, we must eliminate everything that currently drives up prices—construction regulations, restrictive land policies, high upfront payments, expensive standards, and so on.

One way to do this without years of reform is by establishing “liberty settlements.” These would be to homebuilders what free-trade zones are to businesses: places where capitalism is given relatively free rein in construction. In these settlements, special building laws would apply, ensuring that building a family house could begin without initial costs and that self-building would not be penalized.

These settlements should be located near major urban centers because that’s where people want to live. They should be well connected to cities. All the land in these settlements would be owned by the state, divided into plots of a few hundred square meters, provided with basic infrastructure, and then leased for lifetime to any first-time home seeker who has lived in Slovenia for at least twenty years. The leases would be non-transferable, and the rent for the the entire lease would be so low it would be affordable to everyone. Just enough to cover basic development.

If a tenant wanted, they could reduce their costs even further by building one of the pre-approved, standard-designed homes on their plot. Such construction would not require a building permit; one would only be necessary for non-standard projects.

The state could cheaply acquire space for liberty settlements by reclassifying land it already owns that is currently non-buildable. A square meter of forest costs less than a euro, farmland around three euros—and the bureaucratic stamp to reclassify it as buildable costs nothing.

A Place to Call Home

In theory, liberty settlements are one of the few ideas that should appeal to both liberals and socialists. The concept includes state involvement and a social component, but it is rooted in capitalist ethics, private initiative, and greater individual choice.

In capitalism, what we create and pay taxes on is ours. No one has the right to take away our private property. This applies to our crops, our car, our house, and so on.

But what about the piece of land we own—or the stream that runs through it? No one creates nature; it belongs to everyone. So how can it be ours?

Ownership of nature is a right to use it, based on a social agreement. That agreement allows us to trade that right as if nature were truly our property, because history has taught us that this encourages stewardship and efficient use.

But this social agreement lacks consideration for what happens if we appropriate all of nature—what will be left for those who are yet to be born? Where is their place under the sun, and why should they be born tenants in a world that belongs to everyone?

If we resolve this by ensuring that every person has a right to their own small piece of nature—one they can find in liberty settlements—while rights to the rest of nature continue to be tradable, we maintain a working system of rights and give each person the ability to opt out if they so choose.

Proposal for the Establishment of the Slovenian Military Laboratory (LSV)

Honorable Minister of Defense,

The world around us is restless, and the European Union is adopting measures to strengthen the defense capabilities of its member states. Consequently, your ministry will receive increased funding, and proposals on how to allocate these resources will be placed on your desk.

I propose the establishment of the Slovenian Military Laboratory (hereinafter: LSV), which would have two primary objectives:

1. The agile development of innovative military technology using cutting-edge advancements in artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, modular architecture, etc.
2. Ensuring cost-effectiveness and ease of mass production.

Benefits of LSV for Slovenia:

• As an integral part of the Slovenian Armed Forces, LSV could develop projects immediately, bypassing lengthy public procurement processes.
• It would be directly subordinate to the General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces (GŠSV), ensuring research is aligned with the specific needs of the military.
• LSV would not pursue commercial interests beyond those of the Slovenian Armed Forces.
• LSV would not manufacture equipment but rather design blueprints for mass production, enabling even technologically less sophisticated companies to contribute to national defense capabilities.

The initial annual budget for the laboratory would be ten million euros. It would operate on a "Skunk Works" model, employing a small team (maximum 15) of engineering geniuses. Salaries could remain average, as talent could be attracted through work on highly engaging projects, collaboration with like-minded technology enthusiasts, and the opportunity to contribute to their homeland.

I must emphasize that the most productive and innovative individuals are often not polished professionals with doctorates but practical problem-solvers—sometimes even self-taught—whom Steve Jobs famously described as "the ones crazy enough to think they can change the world."

I am willing to assist in the establishment of LSV and take on the responsibility of setting it up and leading its operations.

The Backlash Against Progressive Policies: Trump’s Appeal and Europe's Political Crossroads

Trump's speech in the USA is an illustration of the destructive effect of extreme leftism on society. Nine out of ten of his policies would not exist without the madness of the past decade.

The fact that a president can boast about:

• securing the national border,
• allowing women to compete in their own sports,
• preventing gender changes for children,
• hiring based on competence rather than race or gender,
• not releasing criminals from prison,
• allowing people to speak freely,
• ensuring that national energy policy is not changed radically by top-down decrees but rather gradually from the bottom up,
• preventing the state budget from becoming a feeding trough for NGOs,
• bureaucracy not being a constitutional category,
• not using marginalization as an excuse for tolerating crime,
• ensuring that public job is not a retirement plan...

...is a consequence of progressive changes dictated by a bored elite that the people did not want.

Time will show that, after a long period, we Europeans made the right decision in Ukraine. But this is only our first correct decision. If politics does not address the above-mentioned problems, people will elect one that will. And perhaps they will maintain solidarity with the EU and Ukraine, as in Slovenia and Italy; or perhaps not, as in Hungary, and Slovakia.

Cultural Marxism is as destructive as the Treaty of Versailles; it does not change societies but deepens divisions and radicalizes them.